Package schnorr
Package schnorr provides custom Schnorr signing and verification via secp256k1.
This package provides data structures and functions necessary to produce and
verify deterministic canonical Schnorr signatures using a custom scheme named
EC-Schnorr-DCRv0 that is described herein. The signatures and implementation
are optimized specifically for the secp256k1 curve. See
https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf for details on the secp256k1 standard.
It also provides functions to parse and serialize the Schnorr signatures
according to the specification described herein.
A comprehensive suite of tests is provided to ensure proper functionality.
Overview
A Schnorr signature is a digital signature scheme that is known for its
simplicity, provable security and efficient generation of short signatures.
It provides many advantages over ECDSA signatures that make them ideal for use
with the only real downside being that they are not well standardized at the
time of this writing.
Some of the advantages over ECDSA include:
- They are linear which makes them easier to aggregate and use in protocols that
build on them such as multi-party signatures, threshold signatures, adaptor
signatures, and blind signatures
- They are provably secure with weaker assumptions than the best known security
proofs for ECDSA
- Specifically Schnorr signatures are provably secure under SUF-CMA (Strong
Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack) in the ROM (Random
Oracle Model) which guarantees that as long as the hash function behaves
ideally, the only way to break Schnorr signatures is by solving the ECDLP
(Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem).
- Their relatively straightforward and efficient aggregation properties make
them excellent for scalability and allow them to provide some nice privacy
characteristics
- They support faster batch verification unlike the standardized version of
ECDSA signatures
Custom Schnorr-based Signature Scheme
As mentioned in the overview, the primary downside of Schnorr signatures for
elliptic curves is that they are not standardized as well as ECDSA signatures
which means there are a number of variations that are not compatible with each
other.
In addition, many of the standardization attempts have various disadvantages
that make them unsuitable for use in Decred. Some of these details and some
insight into the design decisions made are discussed further in the README.md
file.
Consequently, this package implements a custom Schnorr-based signature scheme
named EC-Schnorr-DCRv0 suitable for use in Decred.
The following provides a high-level overview of the key design features of the
scheme:
- Uses signatures of the form (R, s)
- Produces 64-byte signatures by only encoding the x coordinate of R
- Enforces even y coordinates for R to support efficient verification by
disambiguating the two possible y coordinates
- Canonically encodes by both components of the signature with 32-bytes each
- Uses BLAKE-256 with 14 rounds for the hash function to calculate challenge e
- Uses RFC6979 to obviate the need for an entropy source at signing time
- Produces deterministic signatures for a given message and private key pair
EC-Schnorr-DCRv0 Specification
See the README.md file for the specific details of the signing and verification
algorithm as well as the signature serialization format.
Future Design Considerations
It is worth noting that there are some additional optimizations and
modifications that have been identified since the introduction of
EC-Schnorr-DCRv0 that can be made to further harden security for multi-party and
threshold signature use cases as well provide the opportunity for faster
signature verification with a sufficiently optimized implementation.
However, the v0 scheme is used in the existing consensus rules and any changes
to the signature scheme would invalidate existing uses. Therefore changes in
this regard will need to come in the form of a v1 signature scheme and be
accompanied by the necessary consensus updates.
Schnorr use in Decred
At the time of this writing, Schnorr signatures are not yet in widespread use on
the Decred network, largely due to the current lack of support in wallets and
infrastructure for secure multi-party and threshold signatures.
However, the consensus rules and scripting engine supports the necessary
primitives and given many of the beneficial properties of Schnorr signatures, a
good goal is to work towards providing the additional infrastructure to increase
their usage.
Constants
These constants are used to identify a specific RuleError.
const (
ErrInvalidHashLen = ErrorKind("ErrInvalidHashLen")
ErrPrivateKeyIsZero = ErrorKind("ErrPrivateKeyIsZero")
ErrSchnorrHashValue = ErrorKind("ErrSchnorrHashValue")
ErrPubKeyNotOnCurve = ErrorKind("ErrPubKeyNotOnCurve")
ErrSigRYIsOdd = ErrorKind("ErrSigRYIsOdd")
ErrSigRNotOnCurve = ErrorKind("ErrSigRNotOnCurve")
ErrUnequalRValues = ErrorKind("ErrUnequalRValues")
ErrSigTooShort = ErrorKind("ErrSigTooShort")
ErrSigTooLong = ErrorKind("ErrSigTooLong")
ErrSigRTooBig = ErrorKind("ErrSigRTooBig")
ErrSigSTooBig = ErrorKind("ErrSigSTooBig")
)
These constants define the lengths of serialized public keys.
const (
PubKeyBytesLen = 33
)
const (
SignatureSize = 64
)
func ParsePubKey(pubKeyStr []byte) (key *secp256k1.PublicKey, err error)
ParsePubKey parses a public key for a koblitz curve from a bytestring into a
ecdsa.Publickey, verifying that it is valid. It supports compressed signature
formats only.
Error identifies an error related to a schnorr signature. It has full
support for errors.Is and errors.As, so the caller can ascertain the
specific reason for the error by checking the underlying error.
type Error struct {
Err error
Description string
}
func (Error) Error
¶
func (e Error) Error() string
Error satisfies the error interface and prints human-readable errors.
func (e Error) Unwrap() error
Unwrap returns the underlying wrapped error.
ErrorKind identifies a kind of error. It has full support for errors.Is
and errors.As, so the caller can directly check against an error kind
when determining the reason for an error.
type ErrorKind string
func (ErrorKind) Error
¶
func (e ErrorKind) Error() string
Error satisfies the error interface and prints human-readable errors.
Signature is a type representing a Schnorr signature.
type Signature struct {
}
func NewSignature(r *secp256k1.FieldVal, s *secp256k1.ModNScalar) *Signature
NewSignature instantiates a new signature given some r and s values.
func ParseSignature(sig []byte) (*Signature, error)
ParseSignature parses a signature according to the EC-Schnorr-DCRv0
specification and enforces the following additional restrictions specific to
secp256k1:
- The r component must be in the valid range for secp256k1 field elements
- The s component must be in the valid range for secp256k1 scalars
func Sign(privKey *secp256k1.PrivateKey, hash []byte) (*Signature, error)
Sign generates an EC-Schnorr-DCRv0 signature over the secp256k1 curve for the
provided hash (which should be the result of hashing a larger message) using
the given private key. The produced signature is deterministic (same message
and same key yield the same signature) and canonical.
Note that the current signing implementation has a few remaining variable
time aspects which make use of the private key and the generated nonce, which
can expose the signer to constant time attacks. As a result, this function
should not be used in situations where there is the possibility of someone
having EM field/cache/etc access.
▾ Example
This example demonstrates signing a message with the EC-Schnorr-DCRv0 scheme
using a secp256k1 private key that is first parsed from raw bytes and
serializing the generated signature.
Code:
pkBytes, err := hex.DecodeString("22a47fa09a223f2aa079edf85a7c2d4f8720ee6" +
"3e502ee2869afab7de234b80c")
if err != nil {
fmt.Println(err)
return
}
privKey := secp256k1.PrivKeyFromBytes(pkBytes)
message := "test message"
messageHash := blake256.Sum256([]byte(message))
signature, err := schnorr.Sign(privKey, messageHash[:])
if err != nil {
fmt.Println(err)
return
}
fmt.Printf("Serialized Signature: %x\n", signature.Serialize())
pubKey := privKey.PubKey()
verified := signature.Verify(messageHash[:], pubKey)
fmt.Printf("Signature Verified? %v\n", verified)
Output:
Serialized Signature: 970603d8ccd2475b1ff66cfb3ce7e622c5938348304c5a7bc2e6015fb98e3b457d4e912fcca6ca87c04390aa5e6e0e613bbbba7ffd6f15bc59f95bbd92ba50f0
Signature Verified? true
func (Signature) IsEqual
¶
func (sig Signature) IsEqual(otherSig *Signature) bool
IsEqual compares this Signature instance to the one passed, returning true
if both Signatures are equivalent. A signature is equivalent to another, if
they both have the same scalar value for R and S.
func (sig Signature) Serialize() []byte
Serialize returns the Schnorr signature in the more strict format.
The signatures are encoded as:
sig[0:32] x coordinate of the point R, encoded as a big-endian uint256
sig[32:64] s, encoded also as big-endian uint256
func (*Signature) Verify
¶
func (sig *Signature) Verify(hash []byte, pubKey *secp256k1.PublicKey) bool
Verify returns whether or not the signature is valid for the provided hash
and secp256k1 public key.
▾ Example
This example demonstrates verifying an EC-Schnorr-DCRv0 signature against a
public key that is first parsed from raw bytes. The signature is also parsed
from raw bytes.
Code:
pubKeyBytes, err := hex.DecodeString("02a673638cb9587cb68ea08dbef685c6f2d" +
"2a751a8b3c6f2a7e9a4999e6e4bfaf5")
if err != nil {
fmt.Println(err)
return
}
pubKey, err := schnorr.ParsePubKey(pubKeyBytes)
if err != nil {
fmt.Println(err)
return
}
sigBytes, err := hex.DecodeString("970603d8ccd2475b1ff66cfb3ce7e622c59383" +
"48304c5a7bc2e6015fb98e3b457d4e912fcca6ca87c04390aa5e6e0e613bbbba7ffd" +
"6f15bc59f95bbd92ba50f0")
if err != nil {
fmt.Println(err)
return
}
signature, err := schnorr.ParseSignature(sigBytes)
if err != nil {
fmt.Println(err)
return
}
message := "test message"
messageHash := blake256.Sum256([]byte(message))
verified := signature.Verify(messageHash[:], pubKey)
fmt.Println("Signature Verified?", verified)
Output:
Signature Verified? true